



1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Introduction

On Hiroshima becoming history

N.A.J. Taylor and Robert Jacobs

A great deal has been written about Hiroshima.¹ One only needs to mention the city's name—Hiroshima—and people of all generations tend to recall the two nuclear attacks that America inflicted on Japan on August 6 and 9, 1945. Over time, however, there is also the growing tendency for the memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, along with the awareness of nuclear weapons and war in general, to fade from contemporary consciousness. Simply put, Hiroshima is becoming history. Nevertheless, for those who have retained a sense of the nuclear imaginary, Hiroshima has come to stand-in for a world historical event—and a crime against humanity—that called into question the very meaning of harm, as well as of life, death, and politics.² For the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were just that: attacks. Attacks not only on the human body, but also on the biosphere on which all life depends. In this way, both Hiroshima and Nagasaki introduced a form of harm that was fundamentally different-in-kind from all others that had gone before it.

In 1999, prominent journalists in the United States were asked to vote on the top 25 news stories of the twentieth century.³ When the results came in, the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Japan topped the poll. For many it was an important story because it was said to have “ended World War Two.” For others, it was because of the threat of the Cold War. Either way, the significance of the weapon was linked to its role in either an actual or potential nuclear war.⁴ Throughout the last half of the twentieth century many people fixated on the threat of a global thermonuclear war during the Cold War, and when that threat was largely averted with the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the place of nuclear weapons in our imagined future became murky at best. Amid fears of proliferation, use by non-state actors, dirty bombs, and regional nuclear war, the notion that nuclear weapons were altogether different-in-kind has been lost amid a deeply troublesome climate of fear that seemingly pervades our time. From this perspective, the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki increasingly became footnotes to twentieth-century history. However, just as radiation persists long after initial contamination, Hiroshima has not receded into the near past: a remnant of a historical trauma and a narrowly averted threat of Cold War aggression. Much as the uranium-235 that has settled deep into the soil of Hiroshima and the Seto Inland Sea (where much of the contaminated topsoil



2 N.A.J. Taylor and R. Jacobs

of Hiroshima was dumped), and the plutonium that has settled into the soil of Nagasaki, the half-life of this history is arguably only just beginning. Our shared nuclear past is the Earth’s nuclear future.

Nuclear technologies are produced in short periods of time. The Manhattan Project delivered nuclear weapons to the United States military in less than five years. The United States and the U.S.S.R. both transitioned from fission weapons to fusion weapons in less than 10 years. However, the materials produced out of this technology began a life that is lived on an almost inconceivable timescale. It is likely true that long past the time when there is still a city named Hiroshima, the residue of the nuclear attack will still be present at the site. We place our understanding of Hiroshima and Nagasaki into the container of twentieth-century warfare and history: it was the most important news story of the twentieth century. Our relationship to radionuclides, produced by both civilian and military nuclear technologies, may be the story of the millennium, or millennia. This long-term relationship to radiation, separate from our anxieties about the use of nuclear weapons, will continually demand that we engage in a process of experiencing and re-imagining Hiroshima again-and-again.

The entry of radionuclides into our ecosystem did not begin in Hiroshima, just as the detonation of nuclear weapons and perhaps even the dawn of the Anthropocene epoch did not begin in Hiroshima.⁵ Hiroshima, however, remains our touchstone, our talisman: the name given to our changed relationship to both nature and human technological culture. For those living 5,000 years in the future, the name Hiroshima may still resonate, but it will not be for the same reasons that it resonated with the journalists who participated in the 1999 survey. Thus, as we find ourselves in the early years of being liberated from seeing Hiroshima strictly in terms of World War Two, or in terms of our own vulnerability during the Cold War, we are in a unique position to begin a work that will be ongoing for scholars: re-imagining Hiroshima as it relates to current times, and not just the twentieth century.

We have therefore compiled this volume at a critical juncture. The project began in June 2014 with our original call for papers asking potential contributors to “re-imagine the nuclear harm that was inflicted [at Hiroshima and Nagasaki], and its aftermath.” Through the process of collating and editing the papers over the last few years, first for the scholarly journal, *Critical Military Studies* (Taylor and Jacobs, 2015), in commemoration of the 70th anniversary of atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and then for this expanded volume, while our resolve has only firmed, our focus has narrowed on this notion that Hiroshima can indeed be experienced, even by non-Japanese or others implicated in the nuclear, and even today. The chapters we have assembled for this collection therefore address the recollection, memorialization, and commemoration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by officials and states, but also ordinary people’s resentment, suffering, or forgiveness. We attempted to include contributions from authors outside the city walls, but were especially eager to publish papers from those who are themselves closely connected to the cities of Hiroshima or Nagasaki, and its people. As you shall see, contributions specializing in art,

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45



1 photography, and design have been considered just as crucial as knowledge
2 derived from the humanities and social sciences. As we argued in our original
3 call, “[w]e look to a variety of perspectives to gain moral and political insights
4 on the full range of vulnerabilities—such as emotional, bodily, cognitive, and
5 ecological—that pertains to nuclear harm.” In this way, this edited collection
6 therefore constitutes one of the first works in the emerging field of Nuclear
7 Humanities.

8 To situate this collection inside this idea of Hiroshima becoming history, we
9 have ordered the remainder of this present chapter according to the three histor-
10 ical tenses: past, present, and future. It begins—in the first section—with a brief
11 account of the earlier responses to the nuclear attacks, which we argue tended to
12 be carried out by Anglo-American male scholars with little to no engagement or
13 *experience* of the harm that was inflicted. Engaging these marginalized voices is
14 interesting and important since it enables us to contextualize our re-imaginings,
15 and to canvass some of the key reasons that warrant (and perhaps even necessi-
16 tate) approaching the nuclear attacks on Japan in new ways. In the second part,
17 Robert Jacobs offers a personal account of being an American in Hiroshima on
18 August 6, 2015—the date that marked the 70-year anniversary of the nuclear
19 attacks on that city—as well as the subsequent first visit to either the Hiroshima
20 or Nagasaki memorials by the head of a nuclear weapon state, at the time, United
21 States President Barack Obama to Hiroshima in 2016. In so doing, Jacobs’ nar-
22 rative averts our gaze from the historical literature to the ordinary every day,
23 which reaffirms how authors writing today, many of whom who are neither Japa-
24 nese nor American, or living at the time of the attacks, may too *experience* Hiro-
25 shima. Finally—and third—we introduce the various contributions included in
26 this volume, as well as put forward some questions that create space for future
27 re-imaginings of this notion that Hiroshima is becoming history.

28 **August 6, 1945: early responses to the nuclear attacks**

29 Our stated aims are bold. We are calling for the manifold experiences of a world
30 historical event that occurred over 70 years ago to be re-imagined; interpreted
31 anew or approached from an altogether different perspective. We have no doubt
32 some, particularly the nuclear arms control wonks in the United States, will
33 regard such a task unnecessary and/or inadvisable. Indeed, a further question
34 remains as to why—that is, why now, and why at all—must we begin to
35 re-imagine Hiroshima, if at all? What is it about encountering experiences? We
36 come to disclose our reasons by way of a critical engagement with the existing
37 literature that is punctuated by Anglo-American inquiries performed at some
38 remove from the harm that was inflicted.

39 The nuclear scholarship of the Cold War era was often framed with introduc-
40 tions and conclusions in which the author explicitly states that they hope their
41 work can help awaken readers to the real risks and dangers of nuclear war. Calls
42 to activism, and entreaties for scholarship to play a role in steering governmental
43 policy, or facilitating antinuclear organization in civil society, stand unique in
44
45



4 N.A.J. Taylor and R. Jacobs

modern scholarship. One cannot imagine such inclusions in works on the Civil War, on Ancient Rome or histories of commodities like cotton or steel. This reflects the depths of personal anxiety and distress among many who worked on nuclear issues during the Cold War. Their fears that the world stood on the brink of annihilation appear to have motivated, if not their choice in scholarship than certainly their orientation toward their chosen subject of inquiry. For instance, all paled in the shadow of the threat of global thermonuclear warfare. They were advocating not simply scholarship, but survival. Historian Paul Boyer in *By the Bomb's Early Light*, his foundational study of nuclear thought and culture in the early Cold War and an influential tome in the wave of nuclear scholarship in the 1980s (stimulated in part by the nuclear brinksmanship of the early years of the Reagan Presidency) reflects in his introduction,

As is appropriate, this book will be read and judged by my professional peers as a piece of scholarship like any other. I hope it will not seem presumptuous to say that it is also intended as a contribution, however flawed, to the process by which we are again, at long last, trying to confront, emotionally as well as intellectually, the supreme menace of our age.

Boyer concludes his introduction even more explicitly, "This book is a product of experiences outside the library as well as inside, and it not the work of a person who can view the prospect of human extinction with scholarly detachment."⁶ Such was the depth and reach of nuclear anxiety during the Cold War era. The omnicidal stakes of the Cold War made scholarship as traditionally practiced perhaps mundane, and more certainly futile.

This held true for those working with nuclear iconography as well as nuclear history. When one looks at the "nuclear art" of the 1980s, most focuses on nuclear weapons, and specifically the threat of nuclear war. Mark Vallen's 1980 silkscreen street poster, "Nuclear War?! ... There goes my career!" went from the cover of the *LA Weekly* to exhibitions in the Los Angeles Transport Gallery to the Parco Museum in Tokyo and the Museum of Modern Art in New York City. Today a great deal of art being made around nuclear issues has focused on the dilemma that surrounds the legacy of nuclear waste from both civilian and military applications of nuclear technology.⁷ Indeed, as the large-scale production of plutonium was first initiated to obtain material for use in the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima, and more specifically on Nagasaki, for those living in future generations, the most important significance of Hiroshima and Nagasaki may be that these were the historical justifications to begin mass production of plutonium, a very real and deadly legacy of nuclear technologies that they will have to grapple with no matter how the winds of history and warfare blow for those of us living during the Cold War and immediately after.

The end of the Cold War brought a global sigh of relief to those who had fixated on the threats and consequences of the feared global nuclear exchange. While nuclear weapons remained a dire threat to human civilization, the risk of an exchange of thousands of weapons in the megaton range during an afternoon

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45



1 appeared to have been escaped. In contrast to the heavy output of the 1980s, the
2 immediate post-Cold War era saw a marked decrease in scholarship about
3 the Cold War and the threat of nuclear harm. However, as time passed, and the
4 century turned, we have seen the emergence of a new style of nuclear scholar-
5 ship that seems to have been impossible, if not unthinkable, during the years of
6 the Cold War threat of nuclear war. This new wave of nuclear scholarship
7 embodies instincts that are both a return to traditional analytical work, and a
8 visionary move toward a much more inclusive and diverse scholarly approach.
9 This scholarship has seen important work done in diverse fields including archi-
10 tectural history, geography, theatre history, childhood studies, gender studies,
11 the history of music, studies of racial dimensions of nuclear fear and activism,
12 and many other fields. These are not works of advocacy, but deep and nuanced
13 work that considers the Cold War experience in the continuum of human social
14 construction and organization. Their aim is not to save the world but to detail it.
15 We are in a period where nuclear scholarship has been liberated from its mission
16 to redeem the human species and that liberation has been fertile and provocative.

17 In this context, Hiroshima is no longer limited to being a warning and a har-
18 binger. It can be a town, a place where people live and where an astonishing
19 historical trauma was inflicted. It is time to re-imagine Hiroshima (and Naga-
20 saki) not as markers of our destiny, but as Hiroshima, and Nagasaki—real
21 places. Hiroshima and Nagasaki will always carry symbolic content, just as does
22 Auschwitz, and for that matter Istanbul, Rio de Janeiro, and Moscow. These are
23 actual places as well as historically significant sites full of implications and pro-
24 jections. In Western scholarship Hiroshima and Nagasaki were constricted to
25 being sites warning us of a horrifying destiny. Now they are so much more. It's
26 time to begin to reconsider them in our scholarship.

27 28 **Reflections of an American in Hiroshima, today**

29
30 The 70th anniversary commemoration of the nuclear attack on Hiroshima was
31 far more crowded than it had been during the 12 years Robert Jacobs, co-editor
32 of this volume, has spent living and working in Hiroshima. Attendance, espe-
33 cially foreign attendance, had dropped off dramatically after the 3/11 Fukushima
34 nuclear disaster. Since then the numbers had slowly begun to grow, but in 2015
35 the crowds, and especially the presence of foreigners and international media,
36 was larger than it had been in over 10 years. Some estimates suggest the crowd
37 had swelled that year into the tens of thousands, with formal representation from
38 over 100 governments. As an American historian of nuclear technologies living
39 in Hiroshima, he has frequently been interviewed by international media cover-
40 ing the anniversary of the attack. Jacobs reasons that being the sole native
41 English-speaking nuclear historian is the reason for his press appearances, as the
42 few English-speaking *hibakusha* (or, atomic survivor) are also the ones repeat-
43 edly interviewed by these same media outlets. By contrast, the Japanese press
44 is full of the many Japanese scholars in Hiroshima who can speak on this topic.
45 For the most part those interviews had been alike in their content: interviewers



6 N.A.J. Taylor and R. Jacobs

asked about the scale of the devastation after the attack, the rebuilding of Hiroshima, and the plight of the hibakusha. The focus was on the experiences in Hiroshima.

In the 70th year the media requests started earlier and were many. Jacobs was interviewed by numerous international television and radio news services, and almost a dozen international newspapers.⁸ The focus of the interviews was noticeably different than in previous years. While he did receive questions about the rebuilding of Hiroshima, Jacobs received almost none about the scale of the devastation from the bombing or the plight of the hibakusha. However, from almost every news organization he was asked questions about the ethics of the nuclear attacks on the two cities.⁹ Invariably these questions took the form of asserting the idea that the attacks had saved lives compared to the alternative of a United States invasion of mainland Japan, and then asking for his opinion on this claim.

It is worth noting that here in Hiroshima the 70th anniversary year had added weight as many in the community are aware that this would be one of the last “big” anniversaries in which people could hear direct testimony about the attack from living hibakusha. The average age of hibakusha is now over 80, and so five to 10 years from now, there will be fewer surviving hibakusha to provide public testimony.¹⁰ Even now when you listen to hibakusha testimony here in Hiroshima, or in Nagasaki, you are hearing the stories of people who were children when they endured nuclear attack. It is hard not to come away without feeling that these nuclear weapons were used against tens of thousands of children, and since most military-aged males were away at war, the victims were disproportionately women, children, and the elderly.¹¹ As the hibakusha are aging, so too are the combatants of World War Two. Just as there was profound opposition to including information about the victims of the nuclear attacks in the proposed exhibition of the *Enola Gay* (the plane that delivered the nuclear weapon to Hiroshima) at the Smithsonian Institution by veteran groups in the United States in 1995, there was a push around this anniversary to engage the notion that the use of nuclear weapons against a primarily civilian population was a war crime, and hence, unethical.¹²

Further deepening the gap between historic and historical Hiroshima, the visit by former United States President Barack Obama to Hiroshima on May 27, 2016 altered the traditional narrative told in Hiroshima has about the city’s destiny. The narrative that was central in Hiroshima about the role that the city would play in changing the world was fundamentally altered on that day. This was a narrative that was repeated at almost all August 6 commemorations, as well as at countless conferences and symposia held in the city. The narrative asserted that once leaders of nuclear-armed nations visited to Hiroshima, and met with hibakusha, they would be irrevocably affected and the world would move toward nuclear abolition. The city was imagined as destined to play this essential role, not just of commemorating the nuclear attack of 1945, but to compel the abolition of nuclear weapons. Witnessing Hiroshima, absorbing the lived history of hibakusha, and feeling the depth of the culture of peace that has grown since the

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45



1 city rebuilt, would act upon the conscience of the leaders of nuclear-armed states
2 and disarmament would naturally follow. On May 27, 2016 Barack Obama
3 visited Hiroshima, he met with hibakusha (although there is no evidence he lis-
4 tened to their stories), returned to his nuclear-armed nation, and did not make
5 any moves toward disarmament or nuclear abolition. In fact, over a year before
6 his visit to Hiroshima he had committed the United States to an additional
7 investment of \$1 trillion dollars over 30 years to nuclear weaponry, delivery
8 systems, and weapon development, quite the opposite of disarmament.¹³

9 This visit by the head of a nuclear-armed state to Hiroshima, so deeply longed
10 for in this community for so long, finally occurred with no discernable effect on
11 the commitment of his nation to nuclear weaponry. What will Hiroshima's (and
12 Nagasaki's) path toward affecting nuclear disarmament be in the wake of such a
13 narrative disruption? Hiroshima must become something new; can no longer see
14 itself as the city that would compel world peace.

15 In many ways, we are seeing a similar, temporal tension play out in recent
16 developments in the scholarship surrounding the history of the nuclear attacks
17 on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. During the Cold War, there was a need both to for-
18 mulate arguments about the morality of the nuclear attacks on Japan that main-
19 tained a continued policy of nuclear deterrence, and to frame the attacks against
20 the threats of nuclear war between the United States and the former Soviet
21 Union. That is, Hiroshima and Nagasaki were to be either justifications of why
22 America must maintain nuclear weapons to counter the Soviet Union, or they
23 were warnings of how such a reliance would lead to an ecological, or even
24 global, cataclysm. In 1975 Martin Sherwin wrote,

25
26 To comprehend the relationship between atomic energy and diplomatic pol-
27 icies that developed during the war, the bomb must be seen as both scien-
28 tists and policymakers saw it before Hiroshima: as a possible means of
29 controlling the postwar course of world affairs.¹⁴
30

31 In recent years, especially since the end of the Cold War, this scholarship has
32 been uncoupled from its imbrication with Cold War anxieties and is beginning
33 to be examined from a variety of perspectives no longer wed to the tensions of
34 the times in which they are written.

35 **Future experiences of Hiroshima**

36
37 And so, despite more than 70 years having passed, numerous people continue to
38 claim to have contributed something new to our understanding of Hiroshima,
39 and its aftermath. In 1965 historian Gar Alperovitz wrote about how the attacks
40 on Japan were, in part, aimed at the Soviet Union, spawning the revisionist inter-
41 pretation of the attacks. In 1986 journalist and historian Richard Rhodes won a
42 Pulitzer Prize for propounding the traditional American narrative that the real
43 story behind the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki is primarily one
44 about American scientists. In 1995 Robert Jay Lifton and Greg Mitchell brought
45



the image of Hiroshima home to the United States, arguing that Hiroshima has never really shown up in the consciousness of the country that attacked it with nuclear weapons.¹⁵ These previous efforts are American, reflecting the imbricated relationship of American thinkers with the legacy of the nuclear attacks.

However, major volumes dedicated to thinking freely and imaginatively about the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki are rare. Certainly, there have been very few, if any, concerted attempts to interpret Hiroshima anew and from a range of different perspectives as we earlier asked contributors to a special issue of *Critical Military Studies*. There, our original call for papers yielded submissions from a diverse range of authors who each explored insights, approaches, and methods from art history, anthropology, comparative religious studies, history, international relations, media and cultural studies, philosophy, politics, and war studies, among others. As we read the material, we came to realize that their re-imaginings not only contributed to a better scholarly understanding of nuclear culture in particular, and military studies in general, but taken together, that they might pave the way for scholars of tomorrow to explore novel ways of thinking about the nuclear events of August 6 and 9, 1945.

Despite this, the contributors to this volume variously claim that people—and not just the Japanese and Americans—do indeed continue to *experience* Hiroshima (and Nagasaki). How can this be? Prior to embarking on this project, we editors identified five key pathways for this seemingly paradoxical situation that can be discerned in one or more of the contributions to this volume. First, even after more than 70 years since the nuclear attacks, there remain a select few atomic survivors as well as those implicated on the side of America and her allies who can recollect, first-hand, the events that unfolded at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. That is, testimony from lived experience is still being produced. In this volume, Erik Roper traces the emergence of Korean hibakusha testimonies who were resident in Japan at the time of the nuclear attacks, to examine attempts to remedy their marginalization in Japanese society by way of counter-histories and activism.

Second, there are ongoing processes of memorialization and commemoration that have arguably reached their zenith when former President Barack Obama became the first President to visit Hiroshima Peace Memorial in 2016, after having earlier inaugurated the Manhattan Project National Historical Park in 2015. In this way, officials and states are continuing to (re)write the history with which many more people than at any other time are learning about what transpired for the first time. For instance, Makeda Best, writing in this volume, speculates as to the meaning of memorialization and national memory role of ひろしま/HIROSHIMA (2008) by photographer Ishiuchi Miyako, who “uses clothing and personal items as sites through which to establish and expand the viewer’s connection to the lives and experiences of bombing victims.” Elsewhere, Ran Zwigenberg examines Hiroshima’s relation to nuclear modernity by way of a detailed investigation into how and why Isamu Noguchi’s design for the Hiroshima cenotaph came to be rejected. Jessica Rapson turns her attention to wider appeals to cosmopolitan or global community, via a thoroughgoing examination

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45



1 of Peter Watkins' fictional documentary *The War Game* (1965), in both its ori-
2 ginal context and as reclaimed media in "The Museum of Ante-Memorials"
3 exhibition at the Taipei Biennial in 2012. While in her chapter, Stefanie Fishel
4 choses instead to compare the memorialization of the nuclear attacks in Japan
5 and the United States, before examining how remembering the event from mul-
6 tiple viewpoints could lead us toward different policies or debates about the
7 weapons themselves.

8 Third, there is heightened interest in ordinary people's resentment, suffering,
9 and forgiveness toward the nuclear attacks. This includes the anguish that sur-
10 rounds the nuclear attacks on Japan themselves, as well as the more than 2,000
11 tests that subsequently took place in Earth's atmosphere, underground, and on
12 the seabed. Appropriately then, Kathleen Sullivan's intervention in this collec-
13 tion serves as a reminder that the two nuclear attacks—on Hiroshima *and* Naga-
14 saki—are in fact two bombs of different kinds, against different people, and with
15 different effects. Elsewhere, Adam Broinowski argues that the Japanese dance
16 movement, *ankoku butoh*, is a response to the "structural complex of drivers that
17 underpinned the use and effects of the atomic bomb." Whereas Stuart Bender
18 and Mick Broderick's contribution to this volume, although perhaps an act of
19 commemoration, documents their attempts to catalogue and communicate the
20 little-known Australian involvement at both Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

21 Fourth, there is the increasingly important realization that every living human
22 has radionuclides from the use of nuclear weapons, either in warfare or peace-
23 time. Of the chapters in this collection, Yuki Miyamoto's contribution addresses
24 this theme most explicitly by tracing the media appearances (or lack thereof) of
25 the Hiroshima maidens in Japan and the United States, whose wounded bodies,
26 she believes, were used to normalize the horror of the atomic bombings.
27 Although less directly, Thomas E. Doyle II too takes up this idea in the form of
28 a metaphor by arguing that there are at least two paradoxes of the nuclear age in
29 which the Japanese people are simultaneously "allergic" to nuclear weapons but
30 do not wish to be "treated," while the Japanese government endures the nuclear
31 allergy without ridding itself of the "allergens."

32 Fifth—and lastly—since the field of the Nuclear Humanities, in which there
33 is truly transdisciplinary studies and exchange, is still very much in its infancy,
34 there remain relatively few forums that have yet appeared. Here we profile the
35 work of artist Shinpei Takeda, who has been working through the memories of
36 Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors. In this volume, Marcela Quiroz and Imafuku
37 Ryuta respond to Takeda's artistic practice in dialogue, and Takeda then
38 responds. What results is a meditation between artist and critics who are grap-
39 pling with what nuclear culture and arts can do.

40 To be sure there are many ways of experiencing Hiroshima that are not
41 included in this volume. For instance, we had in our original call for papers
42 probed what it means for the hibakusha concept to have been recently globalized
43 to others affected by ionizing radiation outside of Japan. We had also asked in
44 what ways, if at all, Hiroshima and Nagasaki have begun to provide a template
45 for the commemoration of genocides and war crimes internationally. These are,



however, other streams of work for future scholars working in this exciting new field of Nuclear Humanities.

Notes

- 1 Throughout this editorial introduction, “Hiroshima” is variously used to refer to the Japanese city of that name, as well as to stand in for the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Japan, on August 6 and 9, 1945, respectively. For a critique of this move, see Kathleen Sullivan’s essay included in this volume.
- 2 For instance, N.A.J. Taylor has published extensively on this idea (see 2012, ‘Andrew Linklater: The Problem of Harm in World Politics’. *Australian Book Review*, June; 2014a, ‘Shared Vulnerability in the Anthropocene: Nuclear Weapons, Harm, the Biosphere’; 2014b, ‘Rethinking Cosmopolitan Solidarity: Nuclear Harm from a Cosmic Point of View’. In *Welcome (?) To the Anthropocene*. Allenspark, Colorado: International Society for Environmental Ethics, International Association for Environmental Philosophy, Center for Environmental Philosophy; 2016, ‘Anthropocosmic Thinking on the Problem of Nuclear Harm: A Reply to Seth D. Clippard and a Plea to Mary Evelyn Tucker and Tu Weiming’. *Journal for the Study of Religion, Nature and Culture* 10 (1): 58–65.
- 3 “Top News of the 20th Century,” *CBSNews.com* (February 24, 1999): www.cbsnews.com/news/top-news-of-20th-century/ (accessed February 8, 2017).
- 4 Here it is important to make note of Jacques Derrida’s (1984, *No Apocalypse, Not Now* (Full Speed Ahead, Seven Missiles, Seven Missives). Translated by Catherine Porter and Philip Lewis. *Diacritics* 14 (2): 20–31) claim that “a nuclear war has not taken place,” since what occurred at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was instead a nuclear attack inflicted on the Japanese and the biosphere.
- 5 As at the time of writing, the Anthropocene Working Group of the Subcommittee on Quaternary Stratigraphy, which delivered its recommendation in October 2016 that the world’s first nuclear weapons detonation at Trinity, in New Mexico, United States, may indeed be the marker of this new geological epoch.
- 6 Paul Boyer, *By the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985) xx.
- 7 See, for example, Ele Carpenter, ed., *The Nuclear Culture Sourcebook* (London: Black Dog Publishing, 2016).
- 8 For example, on *Al Jazeera International* television (August 6, 2015): https://youtu.be/c2u_e7-ZuLA (accessed January 23, 2017); Felix Lill, “Vielleicht der schlimmste Tag der Menschheit,” *Hannoversche Allgemeine* (August 6, 2015): www.haz.de/Nachrichten/Politik/Deutschland-Welt/Vor-70-Jahren-explodierte-ueber-Hiroshima-die-erste-Atombombe (accessed January 23, 2017).
- 9 Taylor earlier co-convoked a series of panels on such a theme in 2015 and 2016 with Thomas E. Doyle II. A co-edited compendium titled, tentatively titled *Nuclear Ethics for the 21st Century*, has subsequently been placed on hold. Nevertheless, each of the papers presented in London and Atlanta are being published by the various authors, including Steven P. Lee, Nicola Horsburgh, Alex Leveringhaus, Behnam Taebi, Maria Rost-Rublee, Shampa Biswas, Anne Harrington, Nicholas Wheeler, Anthony Burke, and Scott Wisner. See: N.A.J. Taylor and Thomas E. Doyle II, *Nuclear Ethics after Nye: Perspectives from Politics and Philosophy*, 57th International Studies Association Annual Convention, Atlanta, Georgia, United States, March 18, 2016; N.A.J. Taylor and Thomas E. Doyle II, *Nuclear Ethics after Nye: Perspectives from Politics and Philosophy*, British International Studies Association (BISA) Annual Conference, London: England, June 16–19, 2015.
- 10 As of 2016 there were 174,080 surviving people of over 640,000 legally recognized as hibakusha by the Japanese government. The Global Hibakusha Project of Robert

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45



On Hiroshima becoming history 11

- 1 Jacobs and Mick Broderick seeks to expand our definition of hibakusha to include
2 those exposed to ionizing radiation from nuclear weapons and nuclear power around
3 the world.
4 11 See, Robert Jacobs, "Seeing Children Hidden Behind the Clouds of Hiroshima and
5 Nagasaki," in, Mischa Honeck and James Marten, eds., *War and Childhood in the*
6 *Age of the World Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017) forthcoming.
7 12 Influential texts of this genre include, a themed special issue titled "Ethics and
8 Nuclear Deterrence" of the scholarly journal *Ethics* (1985), Joseph Nye's monograph
9 *Nuclear Ethics* (New York: Shue Press, 1986), and Henry Shue's edited volume
10 *Nuclear Deterrence and Moral Restraint* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
11 1989).
12 13 William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, "U.S. Ramping Up Major Renewal in Nuclear
13 Arms," *New York Times* (September 21, 2014): [www.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/us/us-](http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/us/us-ramping-up-major-renewal-in-nuclear-arms.html)
14 [ramping-up-major-renewal-in-nuclear-arms.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/us/us-ramping-up-major-renewal-in-nuclear-arms.html) (accessed February 9, 2017).
15 14 Martin J. Sherwin, *A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance*
16 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975): 3.
17 15 This assertion is challenged in, Robert Jacobs, "Domesticating Hiroshima in America
18 in the Early Cold War," in, Urs Heftrich, Robert Jacobs, Bettina Kaibach and Karo-
19 line Thaidigsmann, eds., *Images of Rupture between East and West: The Perception*
20 *of Auschwitz and Hiroshima in Eastern European Arts and Literature* (Heidelberg:
21 Universitätsverlag Winter, 2016): 83–97.
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Taylor & Francis
Not for distribution